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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2353 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
VINCENT SCIROTTO, 
            Appellant 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Criminal No. 09-cr-00288-001 
(Honorable David S. Cercone) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 10, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, ROTH and BARRY, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: October 02, 2012) 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Vincent Scirotto appeals his fifteen-month sentence following a guilty plea to one 
count of making a false declaration in a bankruptcy case in violation of 18 U.S.C.            
§ 152(3). Because we conclude Scirotto validly waived the right to appeal his sentence, 
we will affirm. 
2 
 
I. 
Scirotto was released from prison in 2004 and moved into the house of his friend 
“CJ.” That December, Scirotto sought to buy a house of his own but did not qualify for a 
loan because of poor credit. CJ loaned Scirotto $25,000 for the down payment, and CJ 
signed the mortgage in his own name. Scirotto moved into the new house and agreed to 
make the monthly mortgage payments, but he failed to do so and quickly fell behind. 
Without CJ‟s knowledge, Scirotto filed a bankruptcy petition that included CJ‟s name, 
social security number, and other personal identifiers. The petition triggered an automatic 
stay provision, preventing the lender from foreclosing. Scirotto hoped this would allow 
him enough time to become current on mortgage payments. The provision delayed 
foreclosure for several months, but the lender ultimately foreclosed on the house. 
In 2009, a grand jury indicted Scirotto for one count of making a materially false 
declaration in a bankruptcy petition under 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) (count one) and one count 
of perjury under 18 U.S.C. § 1621(2) (count two). Scirotto signed a written guilty plea 
agreement with the government. Scirotto agreed to plead guilty to count one and the 
government agreed to move to dismiss count two and to recommend a two-level 
reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. The plea agreement also 
provided, “[t]he parties agree that the offense level should be calculated under either § 
2B1.1 or § 2J1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, and they reserve the right to present their 
respective positions to the Court.” Section 2B1.1 covers fraud and carries a base offense 
level of six; section 2J1.3 covers perjury and carries a base offense level of fourteen. 
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In the plea agreement, Scirotto waived his right to take a direct appeal, file a 
motion to vacate the sentence, or otherwise collaterally attack the sentence, with  three 
exceptions: if (1) the government made a direct appeal from the sentence; (2) the 
sentence exceeded the statutory limits; or (3) the sentence unreasonably exceeded the 
sentencing guideline range determined by the court. 
At the change of plea hearing, the District Court conducted an extensive colloquy 
with Scirotto under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).  Scirotto confirmed he had read and signed 
the plea agreement, discussed it with his attorney, and fully understood its contents. He 
also testified he was satisfied with the performance of his attorney. The District Court 
specifically reviewed the appellate waiver provision with Scirotto. The court confirmed 
Scirotto understood the waiver and the rights waived.   Scirotto affirmed he had not been 
induced to sign the document by any promises not contained in the plea agreement. 
In position statements, as anticipated in the plea agreement, the parties disputed 
which sentencing guideline applied. Scirotto argued for the use of the fraud provision 
with a lower base offense level, § 2B1.1. The government argued for the use of the 
perjury provision, § 2J1.3. After reviewing the  indictment, the District Court found that 
making false representations on a bankruptcy petition was “more akin to perjury than 
fraud, thus warranting the application of U.S.S.G. § 2J1.3.” The court set Scirotto‟s base 
offense level at twelve after a two-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility. With a 
criminal history category of III, Scirotto‟s sentencing guideline range was fifteen to 
twenty-one months‟ imprisonment. The court rejected Scirotto‟s plea for a non-custodial 
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sentence and sentenced him to the guideline minimum term of fifteen months‟ 
imprisonment and a $100 assessment.  
Scirotto filed a timely notice of appeal with a new attorney. He urges us not to 
enforce the appellate waiver, contending former counsel was ineffective during the guilty 
plea for failing to preserve for appeal the issue of sentencing guideline selection. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  See United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(holding the court of appeals had subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding a 
defendant‟s waiver of appellate rights in a plea agreement). Our review of the validity 
and applicability of the appellate waiver in Scirotto‟s plea agreement is de novo. United 
States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).  
Where the government invokes a defendant‟s appellate waiver, we must decide the 
enforceability of the waiver as a threshold matter. United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 
926 (3d Cir. 2008). We will decline to review the merits of Scirotto‟s appeal “if we 
conclude (1) that the [issue] he pursues on appeal [falls] within the scope of his appellate 
waiver and (2) that he knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver, unless 
(3) enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 927 (citing United 
States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 536 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
Scirotto does not dispute that his appeal falls within the scope of the appellate 
waiver, nor that he signed the appellate waiver knowingly and voluntarily, and there is 
ample evidence in the record to satisfy these requirements. Accordingly, we confine our 
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analysis to Scirotto‟s argument that enforcement of the appellate waiver will lead to a 
miscarriage of justice. 
We have recognized “[t]here may be an unusual circumstance where an error 
amounting to a miscarriage of justice may invalidate the waiver.” United States v. 
Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 562 (3d Cir. 2001). In Khattak, we identified factors to determine 
whether enforcing the waiver creates a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 563. Those factors 
are:  
The clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a 
fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory maximum), the impact of 
the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the 
government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. 
 
Id. (quoting United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001)). The miscarriage of 
justice exception “„will be applied sparingly and without undue generosity.‟” United 
States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26). In 
rare circumstances, we have recognized ineffectiveness of counsel may prevent 
enforcement of appellate waivers. See United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 301-02 
(3d Cir. 2007) (defendant‟s counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to file a timely 
appeal raising an issue explicitly exempted from the appellate waiver provision). 
 Scirotto argues his counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his right to 
appeal the applicable sentencing guideline, and that enforcing the waiver will create a 
miscarriage of justice. We disagree. Scirotto reaped significant benefits by pleading 
guilty. The government agreed to move to dismiss count two and recommend a two-point 
sentencing reduction. Furthermore, unlike the rare circumstances where we have found 
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ineffective counsel created a miscarriage of justice, enforcing the waiver here will not 
deprive Scirotto of rights retained in the agreement, but effectuate both parties‟ 
expectations under the agreement. The agreement expressly anticipated the dispute over 
whether the fraud or the perjury guideline would be applied at sentencing, and reserved 
that issue. That is exactly what occurred. Enforcing Scirotto‟s appellate waiver does not 
give rise to a miscarriage of justice.
1
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will enforce the appellate waiver in Scirotto‟s plea 
agreement and affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence. 
                                              
1
 Assuming we were to reach the merits, it appears that defendant cannot prevail. We 
review de novo the District Court‟s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United 
States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009). When the offense of conviction falls 
under multiple Guideline provisions, the District Court is to determine the applicable 
provision based solely on “the offense conduct charged in the count of the indictment or 
information of which the defendant was convicted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a). As the District 
Court found, the indictment charged Scirotto with knowingly making a material false 
declaration under penalty of perjury that “CJ was seeking relief under the bankruptcy 
code by forging the signature of CJ on the voluntary petition” for bankruptcy. The 
indictment did not characterize Scirotto‟s actions “as being part of a plan to avoid making 
payment to specific creditors.” United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 836 (4th Cir. 
2010). Accordingly, the District Court was correct to apply the perjury provision, § 2J1.3. 
See id. at 836-37. 
